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Abstract
Need of infrastructure less, self operating, self configuring, communication networks
have resulted in the formation of mobile ad hoc networks (MANET). MANET has
proved very useful over traditional networks in disastrous conditions. In MANET all
mobile devices work cooperatively for route discovery and data transmission. Due
to its broadcast nature of transmission, and cooperative model of working, routing
the traffic is a tedious task in MANET. Routing protocols are constantly targeted
by attackers to cause damage to network. Routing protocols in MANET needs to be
robust against various security threats. Ad hoc on-demand distance vector routing
(AODV) protocol is widely used and studied in the area of mobile ad hoc networks.
In this work, we present a secure AODV protocol to mitigate Black Hole Attack.
In black hole attack a node maliciously diverts the data to route through it, and
then drops the data packets, which results in lower packet delivery ratio. For this
we have introduced a decision module in routing algorithm, which scans the RREP
messages coming from a node before forwarding them towards the sender. Decision
module has been build to exploit the black hole attack model. We check for the
freshness and the path length mentioned in the reply message. Depending upon
these values we decide whether to forward this reply or not. Thus eliminating the
false replies. We simulated this proposed scheme to measure its effectiveness using
NS-3. The results shows that our proposed algorithm shows better performance in
terms of higher packet delivery ratio.
Keywords: MANET, Routing Protocol, Security, Black Hole Attack
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Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Wireless communication has many pros over the wired networks. Mobile Ad-hoc
Network (MANET) has gained lot of popularity over wired networks due to their
unique characteristics. The word ad hoc has Latin roots and means on the fly.
MANET is a particular network for a particular application. MANET requires
no fixed infrastructure for its working. Network devices (nodes) are mobile and
communicate over a wireless medium. Also, there is no central controlling authority
that manages the network. The participating nodes do network management and
routing of data. The participating nodes of the network have limited resources. This
difference from the wired network, MANET faces various challenges such as battery
constraints, dynamic topology, and bandwidth constraints [1].
Mobile ad hoc network faces various security challenges due to its nature. A lot of
vulnerabilities arise due to no central authority and wireless medium of transmission.
Route establishment and data transmission are two important functions of routing
algorithm in MANET. These two phases need to be secured from attackers. The
routing protocol must be so robust that it can withstand various attacks. Hence,
reliable communication implies secure routing algorithm.
2
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In this research work, we consider securing route management phase of the
routing protocol to mitigate a particular type of attack called as Black Hole Attack
[2]. In this attack a malicious node forces to route the data traffic through it by not
following the actual algorithm and then drops the data packets without forwarding
them to the destination node. Thisattackwill result in denial of service to the
destination node. Before transmitting the data, we make sure that data packets
wont be routed via a malicious node. Our proposed algorithm has a better packet
delivery ratio when under attack than the original routing algorithm.
1.2 Motivation
Security and privacy are very vital aspects of any communication. MANET has
many advantages over the wired network that makes it highly useful in many fields
where wired network cannot be operated. The network performance is degraded
if a malicious node is present in the network. A malicious node can exploit the
vulnerabilities in the MANET in number of ways. Routing protocol in MANET is
another important part that plays very crucial role in data delivery. A node can
misbehave and violate the routing rules causing damage to data transmission.
Tampering with routing protocol can lead to many malicious behaviors, such as
modifying routes, dropping a packet, forging of routing control messages. Thats
why intruder targets the routing protocols to attack MANET. By attacking routing
protocol, alone MANET can be attacked in many ways; such as Hello Flooding
Attack, wormhole attack, Location-Disclosure, Rushing Attacks, Invisible Node, and
Routing Table Attack. Black Hole attack is another attack that disrupts networks
data traffic flow. So a mobile ad hoc network needs a secure routing protocol to
have reliable data flow from source to destination.
3
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1.3 Research Objectives
The objectives that we framed to work in the area of mobile ad hoc networks are as
follows:
1. To design secure routing protocol that will identify the black hole node during
the path setup phase, and hence avoid that path for transmission of data.
2. To analyze the performance of the proposed algorithm using the NS-3 simulator
and compare it with the existing algorithm.
1.4 Our Contribution
In this work, we launched a black hole attack, on the mobile ad hoc network
and evaluated its effect on the performance of the network. We modeled the new
approach to avoid the packet dropping scenario in the MANET. This new approach
considers ’hop count’ as also a metric to identify the forged reply messages.
1.5 Thesis Organization
In this chapter, we have discussed the motivation for the need for secure routing
protocol that can safeguard against the packet dropping attack in MANET.
Objectives of our research are outlined in a nutshell. The organization of the rest of
the thesis and a brief overview of the chapters in this thesis are given below.
Chapter 2: We have briefly described the basic theory about the MANET such
as security issues, routing protocols, and also the works done so far in the area of
packet dropping attack. Chapter 3: in this chapter we have described our proposed
routing protocol to mitigate the packet dropping behavior in the MANET. Chapter
4: in this chapter we have described the evaluation of proposed algorithm using the
NS-3 simulator. Chapter 5: We have concluded our work in this chapter.
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Background
2.1 Introduction
People must be able to communicate if even they are mobile. With the advancement
in communication technology devices have become smaller yet more powerful and
cheaper. Thus, users can exchange information with their devices while traveling
through the large area. To maintain such communications over a large area, there is
a need for some fixed infrastructure like access points, transceivers. Mobile devices
connect this infrastructure to retain their connection while roaming. These supports
are associated with the cost of installments, cost of maintenance. Also, they must
withstand the rough weather, power constraints. Due to some geographic challenges,
such mobile communication support is not available everywhere. Also because of
high cost, low usage rate, poor performance or other commercial reasons access
points cant be set up in some locations. Such cases may arise during conferences; in
situations such as natural calamities, military operations carried out in remote and
inaccessible areas. Ad hoc network enables users to communicate without taking
support of fixed infrastructure. Here we briefly explain the mobile ad hoc networks.
Chapter Organization: Sub-section 2.2 describes the brief about Mobile Ad
Hoc Network, its applications, characteristics, complexity and design of MANET,
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Section 2.3 describes the different routing protocols that exist in MANET, Section
2.4 describes the security issues that arise in the MANET. This section also describes
the security of routing protocols. Section 2.5 describes the related work that is been
done in the secure routing protocol area specifically about mitigating the black hole
attack. 2.6 describe the summary of the chapter.
2.2 Applications & Challenges
A typical mobile ad hoc network comprises of mobile communicating devices that
can roam in and out of network at any time. They transmit and receive messages
over the wireless medium, and require no fixed access point or infrastructure. Also,
there is no central authority to monitor and control the network. The topology of
the network can change rapidly in unpredictable manner because, the nodes can
move in a random fashion in a random direction at any time. A MANET can
work on own, or it can be connected to fix wired network. The nodes in the ad
hoc network handle network management and packet forwarding, i.e. the nodes
also work as routers. There is no special authority to facilitate the communication
between nodes, but instead nodes work in a cooperative manner to communicate
with each other. If nodes fall within each others range, then they communicate
directly using wireless links. If nodes are far from each other, then source relays
packet through intermediate nodes to destination. Here intermediate nodes act as
routers.Hence, each node in the network is a Host (sends and receives data) and
a Router (forwards the packets meant for other nodes.). Hence, such networks
sometimes call as multi-hop wireless ad hoc networks.
A mobile ad hoc network is shown in Figure 2.1. This network consists of
heterogeneous devices ranging from phones to laptops, personal digital assistant,
computing devices and so on. A neighboring node is the one that falls within the
transmission range of the sending node. Device A can directly communicate to
machine B and E whereas it routes packets through C and B to communicate with
7
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node D.
Figure 2.1: Mobile Ad hoc Network
2.2.1 MANET Applications
MANET is useful in many situations and hence has found many applications [3] [4].
We name some applications bellow.
 Military Applications
– Battlefields
– Communications in Hilly area.
 Emergency Applications
– Search missions
– Rescue and Relief Operations
– Natural Calamities
– Medical camps during disaster management
 Academics
– Virtual Classrooms
– Meetings or conferences
– Campus Settings
8
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 Personal
– Conferences/ Meetings
– Home/ office wireless networking
 Commercial Applications
– Visitors network
– Stadiums, Malls, Trade Fairs
– Electronic Payments
– Mobile Offices
– Road guidance
– Inter vehicle networks
 Sensor Networks
 Coverage Extension
2.2.2 Challenges
The features such as no infrastructure need, no central regulatory authority, on the
go setup has imposed few challenges compared to the wired network. Some problems
arise due to the wireless nature of communication while some new issues arose due to
the ad hoc nature. Mobility of nodes imposes new challenges to routing algorithms.
Also, limited resources add up more challenges to the mobile ad hoc networks. Few
characteristics and notable challenges are as follows [5] [6]
 Challenges due to Wireless Medium: Broadcast nature of transmission
imposes limitations on communication. Nodes have limited transmission
ranges. Also over shared medium bandwidth for communication is limited.
A lot of packets are lost in transmission. Link capacities vary over places. The
absence of fixed boundaries in wireless medium imposes some more challenges.
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 Limited Resources: mobile nodes are smaller in size and lighter in weight
and thus are supplied with limited battery supplies. Lesser battery backup
can prevent nodes from doing computation intensive tasks. An attacker may
target to disconnect the batteries of nodes thus partitioning the network. If
mobile hosts have limited computational power, than computational intensive
cryptographic solutions might become difficult to implement.
 Mobility Challenges: Mobile hosts are free to move anywhere in the
network with varying speeds. Thus, network topology changes arbitrarily and
frequently. This leads to network partitions, packet loss, link failures.
2.3 Routing Protocols
Routing Protocols in Ad hoc networks handle communication between nodes. They
maintain information that helps nodes to find routes to required destinations.
Routing algorithms set up the path, and also routes the packets on that path
from source to destination. It also takes into account the error in communication
that might arise. Hence, the effectiveness of communication depends upon the
efficiency of the routing algorithm. Various routing algorithms are available in
theory. According to the mode of operation, these protocols are classified in two
broad categories [7].
1. Proactive Routing Protocols
2. Reactive Routing Protocols
Proactive Routing Protocol: A Routing Table data structure is maintained at
every node. All existing paths to remaining destination nodes are kept in that table.
The table is updated with latest information. Any change in the network topology
is reflected in the routing table in no time. Hence, a node has route information to
every other node in all instance of time. Examples are
10
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Reactive Routing Protocol: In contrast to proactive routing protocols, here the
path is setup from source to destination, only when it is needed. The path is
maintained till the data is transmitted. Either source node asks to terminate the
path, or the path information is deleted after a time limit expires. Examples are
Ad hoc on-demand distance vector routing protocol: This is a reactive routing
protocol. When a source node needs to send information to a far destination node,
and it does not have the path information it broadcasts Route Request (RREQ)
message to its neighbors. An intermediate node having fresh enough path to
destination replies with a Route Reply (RREP) message on the reverse path to
the source node. If the intermediate node does not have the route information, it
rebroadcast the RREQ message to its neighbors. When the destination node receives
such request, it send a unicast reply message back to the source node. Forward path
and reverse path are setups while transmitting these control messages, and this
route is then used for data transmission [8]. The freshness of path is maintained
by assigning sequence number to each node. Internet draft explains the working,
message types, header formats in detail.
2.4 Security Issues
Due to the lack of central authority and resource constraints MANET is much more
vulnerable to various attacks. They can be classified by the location of the attacker
or by the mode of operation. They can be classified as internal attack or external
attack, depending on the attacker’s location. Also, attacks can be grouped as Active
or Passive, depending upon the damage it causes to the network. [9]
2.4.1 Passive Attack
When an intruder launches the passive attack, the network continues to operate
normally as there is no alteration being made to the network traffic. The attacker
silently listens to the network traffic, without tampering it. The security service
11
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of confidentiality is violated here. As there are no visible changes in the network
traffic, this kind of attacks is very difficult to detect. Brief information about various
passive attacks is as follows.
 Traffic Analysis: An intruder captures and analyze the network traffic to
know the destination information, source information.
 Eavesdropping: The primary objective to launch this attack is to gain some
secret information that can be later used to launch another attack. The
information stolen can be passwords, private keys, locations of the nodes, etc.
2.4.2 Active Attack
This type of attack disrupts the normal behavior of the network. The attacker listens
to the traffic as well as does the modification to it. An attacker may destroy the
packets or alter some information in it. brief information about active attacks is as
follows.
 Network Jamming: It is a type of denial of service attack. The attacker
tries to block the legitimate communication. It does so by not allowing source
node to send out data packets. An attacker can also prevent a receiver from
receiving the traffic from the network.
 Fabrication: A malicious node creates its forged packets and sends it out to
the network. In such attack, the malicious node does not modify or interrupt
the original packets in the network. The forged packets consume the bandwidth
and other network resources.
 Black Hole Attack: This attack has two stages. Firstly, the malicious node
advertises false route information and thus forces to route the data traffic to
pass through it. And then this malicious node drops the received data packets
without forwarding them to the destination node.
12
Chapter 2 Background
 Byzantine: In this attack a single malicious node or a set of nodes perform
malicious activities to degrade the network performance. These activities may
be selective packet dropping, routing packets via a non-optimal route, creating
routing loops. This attack is a combination of various malicious activities
performed together.
 Wormhole Attack: An attacking node capture and stores the packets in one
place in the network and transmits them to another location in the network.
The attack causes more damage when control packets are tunneled. The
wormhole refers to this tunnel between the malicious nodes.
 Repudiation: The attacking node denies the responsibility of participation
in part or entire communication.
 Denial of Service attack: An attacker floods the network with garbage
traffic in gigantic amount, which causes unnecessary resource consumption.
This traffic consumes network bandwidth and thus stopping the legitimate
traffic to flow into the network. The actual users can not avail the services of
the network.
 Sybil attack: In this attack, a malicious node impersonates to be fake nodes
thus giving an impression that there are several malicious nodes in the network.
 Neighbor Attack: Attacker modifies the packet content so that the receiving
node assumes that the attacker is also a neighbor node. This causes disruption
in the route. The attacker does so by replacing its ID with the existing identifier
in the packet and then it forwards this packet to next node. Thus, two nodes
mark each other as neighbors.
 Modification Attack: attacker modifies the routing packets and forward
them into the network; thus packet’s integrity is at risk.
13
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 Jellyfish Attack: This attack is similar to packet dropping attack. The
attacking node put itself into the path by forging the routing control packets.
And then before forwarding the packets the attacker delays the forwarding for
some time, thus increasing the total delay.
 Gray Hole Attack: This attack is a slight variant of black hole attack. The
first part of the attack is same as black hole attack. Instead of dropping all
the data packets the node selectively drops the packets, thus making it harder
to detect.
2.4.3 Attacks on Routing Protocols
Any network needs its communication to be secure and safe. Maintaining the
same security and safety while communication in MANET is a challenging task.
To communicate securely, route discovery mechanism must also be protected from
attackers along with the data. By tampering with the routing algorithm, an attacker
can launch many attacks on the network. There can be many attacks found in the
literature on the routing protocols, some of them are as follows.
 Sleep Deprivation: The methodology for this attack is to keep other nodes
busy with the routing activity to drain their battery power. An attacker
frequently sends route requests for some destination node to all its neighbors.
The neighboring nodes keep on replying to those messages and thus losing
their resources.
 Flooding Attack: in this attack, attacker node floods the network with false
requests messages, hello messages to clog the network bandwidth, resulting in
DoS attack.
 Routing Table Flooding: The attacker node frequently keep sending route
information to its neighbors, thus forcing them to continually update their
routing tables.
14
Chapter 2 Background
 Black Hole & Wormhole Attack : As explained previously, these two
attacks are the result of the vulnerability of the routing protocols. A malicious
node exploits the routing protocol mechanism to launch these attacks.
In this research work, we will be focusing more on the packet dropping attack i.e.
Black Hole attack. We further assume that routing protocol used in the network is
AODV.
2.5 Related Work
Routing protocols in MANET are a little bit complicated than the traditional one.
The complexity arises due to dynamic nature of topology, mobility of the nodes
and lack of central authority. Also, a routing protocol should withstand again some
security threats to avail the secure communication. The mobility of nodes may cause
more link failures.
Many researchers have designed routing protocols to mitigate the packet dropping
scenario in the ad hoc networks. Kishor Jyoti Sarma et. al. [10] have presented a
survey of various black hole attack detection techniques.
Abderrahmane Baadache et. al. [2] have suggested an approach that uses
acknowledgments to authenticate and to correctly forward packets on the path. In
this method, each packet receiving node sends a reply to the sender node to mark
the successful reception of the message. The communication is authenticated using
hash values. This approach is very computation intensive. Each node on the path
has to recompute the hash value and check. Also, there is communication overhead
due to lack being sent by each node on the route.
Anuj Rai et. al. [7] have proposed a novel way of detecting a black hole node
in the network by using Trap RREQ messages. The method involves sending a
trap route request message, before sending an actual route request. Sender’s of all
the reply messages are blacklisted as malicious nodes. This approach introduces a
significant amount of delay, and it doesn’t address the co-operative black hole attack.
15
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Nabarun Chatterjee [11] et. al. suggested a method involving encryption to
avoid black hole node during the path setup phase. Sender node sends some plain
text to the destination node with the route request message, and the destination
node sends the encrypted text with the reply message. This method allows only
destination node to respond to route request; thus this method is not scalable.
S.Sankara et. al. [12] have used the hash-based technique to avoid black hole
attack. Each node has a unique Id that it uses while sending back the reply. The
response message is hashed, and the hash value is saved in the message to ensure
that reply reached tamper free to the source node. Source node collects all the
response messages for a period, and the then correct route is identified.
Anand Aware et. al. [13] proposed to discard the first reply to reach sender node,
and find the second optimal reply message to carry out the data transmission. This
method fails if the network size is large.
Debarati Roy Choudhury et. al. [14] have given an approach that prevents any
alteration of the normal behavior of the AODV protocol. The source node maintains
two tables, one to store the received replies and other to save the malicious node’s
information.
Satoshi Kurosawa et. al. [15] has given another approach to avoid black hole
attack. In this approach, a threshold value of the valid sequence number is calculated
using feature vector. The mean value for the feature vector is calculated at each
fixed time interval
2.6 Summary
We have discussed mobile ad hoc networks briefly in this chapter. We have also
seen various security issues pertaining the MANET. Various techniques have been
proposed to mitigate the black hole attack in the mobile ad hoc networks. We
have discussed some of them in this chapter. In the next chapter, we describe our
approach to secure against the black hole attack.
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Chapter 3
Secure Routing Protocol
3.1 Introduction
Secure communication in any network is the an essential thing. The routing protocol
needs to be strong enough to sustain various attacks. One such attack is Blackhole
attack. This attack reduces the packet delivery ratio of the network. Here we
describe the proposed mechanism to safeguard the network against the packet
dropping attack. Our approach is to identify the forged RREP messages sent by
the malicious node during the path setup phase. By identifying these fake replies,
we avoid the path formation through the malicious node, and hence data is not sent
to the attacking node. Thus, we avoid the packet dropping scenario at the first
place. We first explain the attack model in detail, then the assumptions and the
network model. Then we describe the working of our proposed scheme.
3.2 Attack Model
This section explains how the black hole attack or packet dropping attack is carried
out. For a simpler explanation, we assume that the network is running AODV
routing protocol. A malicious node performs the attack by just not following the
actual protocol. We first explain the path discovery mechanism in AODV protocol,
18
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and then how a malicious node exploits this protocol to launch the attack.
3.2.1 Path Discovery, Control Messages.
When a source node wants to send some data to a destination node, it checks whether
it has an existing route to the destination. When source node does not have a
route, it starts the path discovery mechanism within the routing protocol.Source
node broadcasts the RREQ message to all its neighbours asking for the path to a
specified destination node. Every request is unique and is identified by request ID
Figure 3.1: Source Node
and sequence number pair. Sequence number depicts the freshness of the information
contained in the message. Also, request message holds the addresses of the originator
and destination node. When the RREQ is received, a reverse path is created towards
the sender of the message.
The request is transmitted hop by hop throughout the network of intermediate
nodes. An intermediate node may or may not have the path information to the
destination node. Hence if the intermediate node has the fresh path information,
then that node generates a Route Reply (RREP) message and sends that reply to the
next hop on the reverse path. It also sends a gratuitous reply to the destination node
on the path that it already has. If there is no information about the destination node
in the routing table of intermediate node, then it simply rebroadcasts the RREQ
message to its neighbours and then waits for the reply to arrive.
When the destination node receives the route request, it creates its reply message
and sends it back to the source node. The reply message contains its fresh sequence
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Figure 3.2: Intermediate Node
number, and the hop count is set to zero. This reply message is sent to the reverse
path hop by hop. Each intermediate node on the reverse path increment the hop
count by one and then forwards it to the next hop.
Figure 3.3: Destination Node
3.2.2 Malicious Nodes Behaviour
The malicious node doesnt follow the actual protocol. When it receives the legitimate
RREQ message requesting the route to a destination, it just drops the request
message without forwarding it. Then it generates a false reply message and sends it
back to the node on the previous hop. This false response conveys that the path, the
malicious node has the route to the destination. The path information is very fresh,
and the path is shortest from the malicious node. Malicious node put a very high
sequence number in the destination sequence number field and put the hop count
as one. The high sequence number means that the path information will be fresh
than information in any other reply messages, and also the path is the shortest. The
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Figure 3.4: Malicious Node
source nodes send data on the shortest and most recent path; hence it routes the
data packets to pass through the malicious node. The malicious node upon receiving
the data packets just drops the packets without forwarding them. Thus, it affects
the packet delivery ratio.
3.3 Proposed Routing Protocol
3.3.1 Assumptions & Network Model
The network consists of devices, which are of similar type and can communicate over
a wireless medium. We term each device as a network node. All the nodes will be
identified using a unique ID. Each node in the network is free to leave the network
at any time also; new nodes can join the network. Any node can malfunction at
any point of time. Each node can be mobile at any time. The node can decide to
move or halt at any location freely. There is no time constraint on the timing of
movement or being stationary. Nodes communicate peer-to-peer over the wireless
medium. The communication channel is multi-hop, error-prone and shared. In our
network model server, node will be the receiver and the client node will send the
data to the server node.
We assume that nodes operate in non-promiscuous mode. This will save the
energy consumption and extra computational overhead. We also assume that any
node having the path information can send the reply message to the source node.
This will reduce the end to end delay up to some extent. The client node is assumed
to have known the address of the server node. We assume that source and destination
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node is different from the malicious node. If there is more than one malicious node
in the network, then we assume that both are unaware of each others presence in
the network. Each malicious node would assume that all other nodes are sane. The
malicious node can target any other node at any time. We also assume that the
malicious node will behave maliciously throughout the lifetime of the network.
3.3.2 Routing Protocol
The success of packet dropping attack depends on, whether the data traffic is routed
through the malicious node or not. The data traffic will be routed through a node
if the source node finds that the path to the node is shortest and fresh. We propose
to modify the existing ADOV protocol to identify the forged reply messages sent by
the malicious node.
Each node in the network upon receiving a reply would check for two elements
in the reply message. The destination sequence number, and hop count value. The
malicious node will set these values very high and very low respectively. Each node
in the network follows the steps mentioned in the algorithm 1.
function Receive Reply(packet,sender);
max seq = get seq();
if ((dst seq no > max seq&&hop < 2))
{
DropRREP ;
DeleteSender;
}
else
{
IncrementHopvalue;
ForwardReply(nextHop);
}
end function
Algorithm 1: Receive Reply
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We have also taken the hop count value into account to identify a malicious
node. Most of the approaches doesn’t take this value into consideration. Thus,
each node in the network acts as a guard to protect from the malicious node.
function get seq();
S ← get start time();
seq ← 0;
while (S ≤ (start time + current time))
{
Seq ← Seq + 1;
S ← S + NetTraversalT ime;
}
return Seq;
end function
Algorithm 2: Sequence Number Generation
3.4 Analysis
Consider a MANET of ten similar nodes enclosed in a small area as shown in Figure
3.5. We assign a sender node, a receiver node and a malicious node. The attack to
happen, the malicious node must place itself in the path between sender and receiver.
The path doesn’t exist between these two nodes. Sender node will initiate route
discovery mechanism, by broadcasting the route request. As soon as the malicious
node receives the route request, it replies with a fake reply consisting of the high
value of sequence number and a short path length. Now as per original AODV
protocol, the reply will be routed back to the sender node through the intermediate
nodes as it is.
Our modification to the original protocol is as per Algorithm 1. The immediate
receiving node checks the content of the route reply message. As routing control
message does not hold any sensitive information, these messages can be checked for
their content by any node. The immediate receiving node calculates the threshold
sequence number at the time of reception of message using Algorithm 2. The values
23
Chapter 3 Secure Routing Protocol
Figure 3.5: Example Scenario - 1
for the Node Traversal Time and Net Diameter are taken from the internet draft of
AODV protocol.
NTT = 2 ∗NodeTraversalT ime ∗NetDiameter
This algorithm returns upper value of sequence number that can be reached at
a given instance of time since the start of data communication. If the sequence
number in the reply message falls below this value, then a legitimate node could
have sent the reply. Thus a response with sequence number value greater than the
calculated value, must be from a malicious node.
Figure 3.6: Example Scenario - 2
Let us assume that, the sender has data to send and it starts sending data
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at T = 5s. As per the internet draft, the Node Traversal Time is 40 ms and
Net Diameter 35 hops. Hence, the Net Traversal Time is calculated to be 2.8 sec.
The figure 3.6 shows the time line of events. The intermediate node when receives
the reply message from malicious attacker, it processes the packet using modified
procedure. The result of procedure 2 is as per the Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Sequence Number Generation
S SeqNo
5 0
7.8 1
10.6 2
If the value of destination sequence number acquired from reply packet from the
attacker is higher than 2 it will be marked as malicious and hence will be dropped
by the receiving node. Thus, eliminating the inclusion of malicious node in the path.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we described, how a malicious node launches the packet dropping
attack on the network, by exploiting the route discovery mechanism of AODV
protocol. Our approach to avoid this attack is simple. In the next chapter, we
delineate the simulation environment and the output that we’ve accquired using the
NS-3.
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4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we have compared the performance of the our proposed model with
the existing AODV protocol using the simulator. The NS-3 simulator is used for
simulations. Experiments were carried, to test the packet delivery ratio achieved
with the proposed scheme. The details of the simulation and the results are as
follows.
4.2 Network Parameters
All the simulations were carried using N-3.20 on Linux machine. The following
aspects were decided randomly, before the start of simulation:
 Initial Position of each node
 Sender Node and receiver Node
 Connection Duration
 Beginning time of each connection
For each protocol, following metrics were calculated and compared.
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 Average Packet Delivery Ratio: it is the ratio of number of packets received
to the number of packets transmitted.
 End to end delay.: it is the average value of delay of all the packets received.
To have transmission range near 250m, environment variable values were fixed
as follows.
Table 4.1: Environmental Parameters
Parameter Value
Energy Detection
Threshold
-61.8 dBm
Clear Channel
Assessment Threshhold
-64.8 dBm
Transmission Gain 0 dBm
Reception Gain 0 dBm
Some other simulation parameters were set as follows. The data traffic was
generated using Constant Bit Rate traffic generator.
Table 4.2: Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value
Area 600 m x 600 m
Number of Nodes 25
Packet Size 1024 B
Simulation Time 350 s
Transmission Rate 200 kbps
Transmission Range 250 m
Mobility Model Random Way-point
Parameter values for AODV protocol are summarized in following Table. The
values are set as specified in the AODV Request for Comment document.
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Table 4.3: AODV Protocol Parameters
Parameter Value
Enable Hello Enable
Hello Interval 3 s
Destination Only False
Net Traversal Time 2.799 s
Route Rate Request Rate Limit 10 messages/s
Route Request Retry 5
Active Route Timeout 100 s
Path Discovery Time 5.599 s
Max Queue Time 30 s
Max Queue Length 255
Allowed Hello loss 20
4.3 Simulation Results
We have analyzed the network performance with original AODV protocol and the
enhanced protocol. The results obtained are as follows.
Figure 4.1 shows the packet delivery ratio for increasing network size. Our
proposed algorithm tends to achieve higher packet delivery ratio when under attack.
Figure 4.2 shows the end to end delay values of the algorithms against the number
of nodes. We have also measured the end to end delay value as the network grows
as shown in figure 4.3. We compared our proposed approach with the existing
approach mentioned in [11], and the simulation result shows that our approach gives
lover delay value when under attack as the network size increases.
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Figure 4.1: Packet Delivery Ratio
Figure 4.2: Total Delay
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Figure 4.3: Total Delay
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have evaluated our proposed approach, using the NS-3 simulator.
We have also evaluated our Enhanced AODV and our protocol shows better
performance than [11] approach in terms of end to end delay.
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5.1 Conclusion
Packet dropping attack reduces the network performance. Our secured AODV
protocol is capable of mitigating the packet dropping attack in MANET. Our
approach doesn’t need any extra massive computational support to withstand this
attack. Hence, more packet delivery ratio is achieved. This approach identifies and
avoids black hole node in the path discovery phase and hence path chosen by the
source node will be secured for data transmission. This approach also has a high
point that it does not depend upon the relationship between the nodes. Thus, even
if a trusted node turn into a malicious node then also our approach can stop the
attack from happening. The simulation is carried out in NS-3. Thus, we evaluated
that our algorithm shows better routing performance than an existing approach in
terms of end to end delay.
Scope For Further Research
Security in MANET is a very vast area of research, we have just touched the surface
of this field. In our algorithm, we have managed to mitigate only packet dropping
attack. This algorithm can be further expanded to mitigate more other attacks.
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